Google’s
mission
statement
seems
made
to
evoke
warm
and
fuzzy
feelings
about
how
its
products
help
everyone.
“Our
mission
is
to
organize
the
world’s
information
and
make
it
universally
accessible
and
useful,”
Google
says
on
its
corporate
site.
The
company
used
to
have
an
even
more
saccharine
motto:
“Don’t
be
evil.”
But
the
decisions
Google
made
in
growing
its
massive
advertising
technology
business
were
cold-blooded
and
carefully
crafted
to
primarily
benefit
itself,
the
Department
of
Justice
argued
during
the
first
two
weeks
of
its
antitrust
trial.
The
DOJ
finished
arguing
its
case-in-chief
on
Friday
in
a
Virginia
federal
court,
and
now
it’s
Google’s
turn
to
haul
in
witnesses,
including
US
government
agencies
that
use
the
company’s
products.
Its
challenge:
to
explain
why
the
government
is
wrong
to
call
it
an
illegal
monopoly
and
why
its
decisions
reflect
reasonable
business
judgments
that
it
shouldn’t
be
forced
to
change.
Over
more
than
nine
days
of
witness
testimony,
the
DOJ
told
US
District
Court
Judge
Leonie
Brinkema
that
Google
manipulated
the
ad
tech
industry
to
revolve
around
itself.
The
government
contends
that
through
its
dominance
across
the
entire
ad
tech
stack,
Google
ensured
rivals
couldn’t
compete
and
publishers
couldn’t
walk
away.
DOJ
counsel
Julia
Tarver
Wood
put
it
this
way:
“The
rules
are
set
so
that
all
roads
lead
back
to
Google.”
A
“slow
and
clunky”
tool
dominates
the
online
ad
world
The
government’s
basic
argument
is
that
Google
monopolized
three
markets:
publisher-side
tools
(mainly
publisher
ad
servers,
where
outlets
sell
ad
space),
a
subset
of
advertiser-side
tools
(where
advertisers
offer
their
ads),
and
the
ad
exchanges
where
auctions
take
place.
While
Google
says
it’s
achieved
a
large
customer
base
by
offering
good
products,
the
DOJ
argues
it
simply
bought
up
competitors
—
like
the
publisher
tool
DoubleClick
—
and
tied
its
products
together
to
lock
customers
in.
The
upshot,
the
government
claims,
is
that
Google’s
customers
pay
higher
prices
for
clunkier
tools
because
the
company
lacks
real
incentives
to
do
better.
Therefore,
customers
have
no
adequate
alternatives
to
turn
to.
The
government
brought
in
witnesses
across
the
industry
to
make
its
case,
including
executives
from
publishers
like
Gannett
and
News
Corp,
ad
agencies,
and
executives
from
other
ad
tech
companies,
including
some
that
tried
(and
mostly
failed)
to
launch
competing
products.
They
also
brought
in
former
and
current
Google
employees,
including
the
CEO
of
YouTube,
Neal
Mohan,
who
joined
Google
when
it
acquired
DoubleClick
in
2008.
The
DOJ
put
Mohan
on
the
defensive
about
another
acquisition,
Admeld,
which
it
claims
Google
bought
to
kill
an
up-and-coming
competitor.
Google’s
publisher
ad
server
(mostly
referred
to
as
DoubleClick
for
Publishers,
or
DFP,
in
the
trial)
holds
a
nearly
90
percent
market
share
in
publisher
ad
servers,
the
government
claims.
Publishers
and
rivals
who
testified
generally
could
only
recall
one
or
two
publishers
who
used
a
different
system.
That
includes
Disney,
which
created
its
own
alternative
to
run
bespoke
ads
—
an
undertaking
few
smaller
media
companies
could
fund,
witnesses
said.
Google’s
DFP
is
“pretty
much
a
foregone
conclusion”
for
most
media
outlets,
testified
James
Avery,
cofounder
and
CEO
of
Kevel.
That’s
not
necessarily
because
DFP
itself
is
better; Stephanie
Layser,
a
former
News
Corp
programmatic
advertising
executive,
called
it
“slow
and
clunky.”
It’s
because
Google
ties
DFP
to
its
massive
AdX
exchange,
according
to
the
government’s
witnesses.
Rejecting
DFP
would
mean
losing
access
to
data
like
real-time
bids
from
Google’s
massive
base
of
advertisers,
which
is
vital
for
an
industry
that
moves
in
milliseconds.
When
Kevel
tried
to
launch
a
DFP
competitor,
Avery
said,
it
failed
to
lure
anyone
away
from
Google
—
publishers
were
too
“deathly
afraid”
of
losing
that
access.
Google
recognized
threats
—
and
neutralized
them
The
DOJ
argues
that
once
Google
was
top
dog,
it
developed
strategic
and
anticompetitive
plans
to
lock
that
dominance
in.
That
included
buying
up
young
competitors
and
launching
new
features
to
neutralize
efforts
at
lessening
its
control.
One
of
the
DOJ’s
main
examples
involves
a
system
called
header
bidding,
which
publishers
began
adopting
around
2014.
Before
header
bidding,
publishers
sold
ad
space
through
a
“waterfall”
method,
offering
the
space
to
one
ad
exchange
at
a
time,
typically
prioritizing
whichever
had
previously
offered
the
highest
prices.
But
Google
made
it
so
that
its
AdX
got
“first
look”
access
through
DFP
by
calling
it
to
submit
a
real-time
bid
before
other
exchanges
got
the
chance
to
take
part
in
an
auction.
That
meant
AdX
could
buy
up
any
inventory
it
wanted
as
long
as
it
met
the
publisher’s
floor
price,
then
pass
the
less
desirable
space
to
other
exchanges,
according
to
the
DOJ.
Header
bidding
was
essentially
a
mini
auction
that
ran
before
ad
space
was
passed
off
to
an
exchange.
Publishers
put
code
on
their
websites
to
solicit
pricing
bids
from
several
exchanges
at
once,
putting
these
exchanges
on
more
equal
footing
in
hopes
that
this
competition
would
lead
to
a
higher
price.
But
Google
moved
quickly
to
reestablish
AdX’s
power.
It
created
a
competitor
to
header
bidding
called
“Open
Bidding,”
which
let
Google
take
an
extra
cut
of
revenue.
And
under
the
adoption
of
header
bidding,
Google’s
AdX
ultimately
got
a
“last
look”
advantage
when
publishers
chose
to
feed
the
winning
header
bid
into
their
publisher
ad
server
—
which
most
often
was
Google’s
DFP.
That’s
because
AdX’s
advertiser
buyers
would
then
have
the
option
to
bid
as
little
as
a
penny
more
than
the
winning
header
bid
to
secure
the
most
attractive
ad
space.
Google’s
attorneys
said
the
company
was
merely
trying
to
create
a
better
online
experience,
raising
concerns
that
header
bidding
facilitated
fraud
and
slowed
down
page
load
times.
But
internal
company
documents
showed
that
executives
understood
the
appeal
of
header
bidding
to
publishers
and
feared
it
could
erode
Google’s
control.
The
alleged
result
was
that
other,
potentially
innovative,
new
exchanges
couldn’t
operate
on
equal
footing,
and
publishers
ceded
more
and
more
control
over
Google
because
they
felt
locked
in.
One
witness
accused
Google
of
“holding
us
hostage”
The
DOJ
claims
this
wasn’t
the
only
time
Google
saw
a
threat
and
clawed
back
control.
Publishers
started
setting
a
higher
floor
price
for
AdX
than
for
other
exchanges,
hoping
to
diversify
where
they
sold
ads.
Google
was
aware,
according
to
internal
documents,
that
publishers
were
trying
to
lessen
their
dependence
on
AdX.
It
responded
in
2019
with
Unified
Pricing
Rules,
or
UPR,
which
mandated
one
price
for
all
exchanges
— neutralizing
the
attempt.
Layser
says
publishers
felt
that
UPR
“took
control
out
of
our
hands”
and
made
it
seem
like
Google
was
“holding
us
hostage.”
And
Google
executives
anticipated
the
blowback.
“We
fear
this
may
generate
pushback
from
publishers
who
may
view
the
move
as
us
taking
away
functionality
they
are
rather
attached
to
and
consider
critical
to
their
business,”
one
executive
wrote.
But
it
went
ahead
with
UPR
anyway,
and
witnesses
told
the
court
that
publishers
had
little
choice
but
to
remain
on
the
platform.
This
was
largely
possible,
the
DOJ
claims,
because
Google
owned
products
across
all
sides
of
the
market.
It
could
leverage
its
dominance
in
DFP
to
set
policies
around
AdX
that
publishers
couldn’t
reject.
And
when
another
product
seemed
threatening,
Google
could
use
the
well-worn
tech
giant
strategy
of
simply
buying
it.
Google
argues
this
made
the
whole
system
better
by
letting
it
run
more
efficiently
— but
the
DOJ
claims
the
company
was
just
nipping
competition
in
the
bud.
The
government
is
also
raising
an
issue
that’s
come
up
in
other
Google
cases:
the
company’s
penchant
for
liberally
labeling
business
documents
as
attorney-client
privileged
and
avoiding
a
paper
trail
with
off-the-record
chats.
The
DOJ
is
seeking
an
adverse
inference
against
Google
for
destroying
evidence,
asking
Brinkema
to
interpret
any
alleged
missing
documents
as
damaging.
Google
has
disputed
that
it
intentionally
hid
its
operations,
saying
it
has
“produced
millions
of
documents
including
chat
messages
and
documents
not
covered
by
legal
privilege.”
But
several
Google
witnesses
failed
to
plausibly
explain
why
their
missives
deserved
a
“privileged
and
confidential”
label
—
allowing
the
DOJ
to
argue
that
it
was
because
they
hinted
at
Google’s
potential
monopoly
power.
What’s
next
Google
is
currently
presenting
its
side
of
the
story.
The
company
is
calling
on
witnesses
that
include
advertisers
from
the
federal
government
to
help
explain
the
value
of
its
products.
Its
counsel
says
it
expects
to
rest
its
case
by
Wednesday
or
Thursday,
followed
by
a
rebuttal
from
the
DOJ.
Closing
arguments
will
be
scheduled
for
later
— followed
by
a
ruling
from
Brinkema.
Google’s
core
argument
is
that
simply
having
a
big,
successful
business
isn’t
illegal.
It
argues
that
tying
its
services
together
and
buying
competitors
has
allowed
it
to
offer
better
products.
And
it
raises
what
it
hopes
will
be
a
killing
blow
for
the
DOJ’s
case:
that
according
to
the
Supreme
Court,
companies
can’t
be
forced
to
cut
deals
with
competitors.
This
case,
however,
follows
two
significant
antitrust
losses
for
Google:
one
in
a
DOJ
case
over
its
search
engine
and
another
in
a
private
lawsuit
over
Android’s
Play
Store.
Google
is
on
the
defensive
—
and
still
awaiting
rulings
on
how
those
monopolies
could
be
busted
up.
Internal
documents
suggest
executives
were
well
aware
of
Google’s
overwhelming
power
in
advertising.
In
one
2016
email,
former
executive
Jonathan
Bellack
likened
Google’s
ad
tech
stack
to
Citibank
or
Goldman
Sachs
owning
the
New
York
Stock
Exchange,
musing
about
whether
there’s
“a
deeper
issue
with
us
owning
the
platform,
the
exchange,
and
a
huge
network.”
Bellack
said
during
testimony
that
he
was
only
trying
to
figure
out
why
publishers
seemed
so
attracted
to
cutting
Google
out
of
their
business,
wondering
if
the
“structure
of
Google’s
business
[was]
unacceptable
to
them.”
Several
of
them
have
testified
in
court
that
it
was
—
and
now
it’s
up
to
a
judge
to
decide
who’s
right.
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